Outils pour utilisateurs
chapitre7
 | Justin Vaïsse, Histoire du néoconservatisme aux Etats-Unis - Site Web compagnon Chapitre 7 : “Ronald Reagan: les néoconservateurs au pouvoir?” (pages 195 à 234) → Continuer vers le Chapitre 8 - Le troisième âge du néoconservatisme → Revenir vers le Chapitre 6 - Alerter l'Amérique: le rôle du Committee on the Present Danger → Retourner à la page d'accueil |
| Pages 196-197 | Note 1 (p. 311) | Citation de la lettre de Richard Allen à G. H. W. Bush | ||
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| “7. The neoconservatives, mostly Democrats, can be yours, too. They can't stand Pat Buchanan's isolationist agenda and, since they're domestically liberal, his domestic agenda either. In 1980 we converted the entire Committee on the Present Danger into a force supporting Reagan, and it was overwhelmingly Democrat in composition. Of its 125 members, nearly seventy served in the Reagan-Bush administration. An outstanding example : Jeane Kirkpatrick, whom I personally brought over the line into our camp. Nitze, Rostow, Kampelman – they all came from the CPD roster Consult with these neoconservatives before they drift back to their natural home among the Democrats. We can get you names.” | ||||
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| Page 197 | Note 2 (p. 311) | Citations de Richard Allen sur le passage des néoconservateurs à Reagan | ||
| “Anyway, I built the bridge and took them over one by one, and it was a great strategic move that Reagan approved. And the benefits were enormous.” “… this crowd represented the best thinking in the field, the question whether they were Dems or Reps was largely irrelevant. Although all had a natural resistance to talking with Reagan. It was not immediately that I thought of taking them to Reagan, but I wanted to take them slowly towards Reagan, because knowing Reagan's thoughts and his views which were identical with theirs, but without the detail and enormous experience that they had, people who were basically embracing the same goals… they ought to be talking. […] Even if they didn't vote for Reagan it didn't matter, so by having a Nitze, a Rostow, and all of the other guys working with Reagan” | ||||
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| Page 199 | Note 13 (p. 311) | Citations de Jeane Kirkpatrick sur les raisons pour lesquelles elle ne devient pas républicaine | ||
| “Eventually the question occurs : why, since our estrangement from the national Democratic Party has lasted for a decade, since it embraces a range of important issues which are not likely to disappear, since we have tried participating, cooperating, compromising, and waiting, in the effort to win back some influence within the Party for our point of view – which is, after all, widely shared by the Party's rank and file – and all without effect, and since we often find Republican policies preferable to Democratic programs, why don't we simply break with the Democratic Party and become Republicans ?” “The problem is that the Republican Party has not articulated any inclusive vision of the public good that reflects concern for the well-being of the whole community.” | ||||
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| Page 199 | Note 14 (p. 311) | Citation de Doug, fils de Jeane Kirkpatrick, sur l'identité de la famille | ||
| “Today, we talked about what we are. Jimmy said he was a Catholic. Then Annie said she was a Jew. My friend Timmy said he's Episcopalian. ” “Well, what did you say? Jeane asked. Her son, all of seven years old, beamed. “I said we're Democrats.” | ||||
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| Page 199 | Note 15 (p. 311) | Citation d'Elliott Abrams et Gertrud Himmelfarb sur le parti républicain | ||
| “For the sentimental link to the party of Truman and Johnson is strong… as is the sentiment that Republicans aren't 'our kind of people.' The GOP, with its flavor of small-town midwestern business America, holds no comfort for Jews.” ; “We are, for the moment, homeless…” | ||||
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| Page 200 | Note 18 (p. 311) | Citation de Penn Kemble sur le rejet de la CDM par les démocrates | ||
| “I wished we could have done that with Democrats, but they lost ! They wrote themselves out of the game. We tried to support them. We supported Jimmy Carter. Scoop Jackson campaigned all over the country for Jimmy Carter, and then what did he get ? We didn't elect to become Republicans. The Democrats elected to blackball us. And how can you say to people who have faced that that they should just keep crawling back in small groups.” | ||||
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| Page 201 | Note 19 (p. 311) | Le ralliement des membres la Coalition for a Democratic Majority à Reagan en 1980 | ||
| NB: L'information pour ce tableau a été recueillie lors des entretiens avec les personnes concernées. | ||||
| Membres importants de la CDM | Soutien pour Reagan pendant la campagne / vote en sa faveur / (évolution partisane) | Fonctions dans l'administration Reagan | ||
| Peter Rosenblatt | Pas de soutien ; vote pour Reagan (reste démocrate) | Aucune | ||
| Joshua Muravchik | Pas de soutien ; vote pour Reagan (reste démocrate) | Aucune | ||
| Penn Kemble | Pas de soutien ; vote pour Reagan (reste démocrate) | Aucune (décline une offre) | ||
| Ben Wattenberg | Pas de soutien ; vote pour Reagan (reste démocrate) | Vice président de Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty | ||
| Max Kampelman | Soutien ouvert en fin de campagne ; vote pour Reagan (reste démocrate) | Ambassadeur à la CSCE à Madrid | ||
| Richard Schifter | Soutien ouvert en fin de campagne ; vote pour Reagan (reste démocrate) | Secrétaire d'État adjoint pour les droits de l'homme | ||
| Eugene Rostow | Soutien ouvert en fin de campagne ; vote pour Reagan (reste démocrate) | Directeur de l'ACDA | ||
| Michael Novak | Soutien ouvert en fin de campagne ; vote pour Reagan (reste démocrate) | Aucune | ||
| Jeane Kirkpatrick | Soutien ouvert en fin de campagne ; vote pour Reagan (devient républicaine plus tard) | Ambassadeur aux Nations Unies | ||
| Elliott Abrams | Fait activement campagne pour Reagan en Floride (devient tout de suite républicain) | Secrétaire d'État adjoint pour les organisations internationales | ||
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| Page 201 | Note 20 (p. 311) | Citation de Norman Podhoretz sur le rôle des néoconservateurs dans l'élection de Ronald Reagan | ||
| “The second point on which there is little disagreement is that the influence of the neo-conservatives contributed to the election of Ronald Reagan. This was not a matter of numbers. As a movement of dissident intellectuals, the neo-conservatives were (and are) a minority within a minority. Nevertheless, if the grip of the Conventional liberal wisdom and the leftist orthodoxies in the world of ideas had not been loosened by the criticisms of the neo-conservatives ; if a correlative willingness to entertain new ideas had not thereby been created ; and if these new ideas had not been plausibly articulated and skillfully defended in the trials by intellecual combats that do so much to shape public opinion in the United States – if not for all this, Ronald Reagan would in all probability have been unable to win over the traditionnally Democratic constituencies (blue collar workers, white-ethnic groups like the Irish and the Italians and a surprisingly high percentage of Jews) whose support swept him into the White House.” | ||||
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| Page 202 | Note 25 (p. 312) | Exemples d’éditoriaux et tribunes des membres du CPD dont Ronald Reagan | ||
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| Page 202 | Note 27 (p. 312) | Ronald Reagan, tout juste élu Président, écrit à ses anciens collègues du CPD, 7 novembre 1980 | ||
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| Page 202 | Note 28 (p. 312) | Fonctions exécutives des membres du CPD dans l’administration Reagan | ||
| Nom | Rôle au CPD et affiliation politique | Fonction dans l'administration Reagan | ||
| Ronald Reagan | Membre du Conseil, républicain | Président des États-Unis | ||
| George Shultz | Membre du Conseil, républicain | Secrétaire d'État (1982-1988) | ||
| Richard Allen | Membre du comité exécutif, républicain | Conseiller de sécurité du président (1981-1982) | ||
| Jeane Kirkpatrick | Membre du Conseil, démocrate | Ambassadrice aux Nations Unies (1981-1985) | ||
| William Casey | Membre du Conseil, républicain | Directeur de la CIA (1981-1987) | ||
| John Lehman | Membre du Conseil, républicain | Secrétaire à la Marine (1981-1987) | ||
| Richard Pipes | Membre du comité exécutif, démocrate | Directeur pour les affaires soviétiques au NSC (1981-1982) | ||
| Geoffrey Kemp | Membre du Conseil, républicain | NSC : directeur pour le proche-Orient et l'Asie du Sud (1981-1986) | ||
| Martin Anderson | Membre du Conseil, républicain | Assistant politique du président (1981-1982) | ||
| Paul Nitze | Membre du comité exécutif, démocrate | Président de la délégation aux négociations INF (1981-1984); Conseiller spécial du président pour les négociations de maîtrise des armements et ambassadeur extraordinaire (1984-1988) | ||
| Eugene Rostow | Directeur du comité exécutif, démocrate | Directeur de l'ACDA (1981-1983) | ||
| Kenneth Adelman | Membre du comité exécutif, républicain | Adjoint de Jeane Kirkpatrick (1981-1983) ; Directeur de l'ACDA (1983-1987) | ||
| Max Kampelman | Membre du Conseil, démocrate | Président de la délégation à la CSCE (1981-1983) ; président de la délégation aux négociations sur les armes nucléaires et spatiales à Genève (1985-1989) | ||
| Donald Rumsfeld | Membre du Conseil, républicain | Représentant personnel du président au Moyen-Orient | ||
| Fred Iklé | Membre du Conseil, républicain | Sous-Secrétaire à la Défense pour les affaires politiques (1981-1988) | ||
| W. Allen Wallis | Membre du Conseil, républicain | Sous-Secrétaire à l'Economie (1982-88) | ||
| James L. Buckley | Membre du Conseil, républicain | Sous-Secrétaire d'État pour l'aide à de sécurité (1981-1982) ; directeur des affaires juridiques (1982) ; président de Radio Free Europe et Radio Liberty (1982-85) | ||
| Richard Schifter | Membre du comité exécutif, démocrate | Représentant américain à la commission des Droits de l'homme de l'ONU (1983-1984), Secrétaire d'État adjoint aux droits de l'homme (1983-1991) | ||
| Richard Perle | Membre du Conseil, démocrate | Secrétaire adjoint à la Défense pour la politique internationale de défense (1981-1987) | ||
| R.G. Stilwell | Membre du Conseil, républicain | Sous-Secrétaire à la Défense adjoint aux affaires politiques (1981-XX) | ||
| Robert Strausz-Hupé | Membre du Conseil, républicain | Ambassadeur en Turquie (1981-1988) | ||
| David Jordan | Membre du Conseil | Ambassadeur au Pérou (1984-1986) | ||
| Richard Stone | Membre du Conseil, démocrate | Ambassadeur extraordinaire pour l'Amérique centrale (1983-1984) | ||
| W. Scott Thompson | Membre du Conseil | Directeur adjoint, Bureau des programmes, USIA (1982-1984) | ||
| Joseph Douglas | Membre du Conseil | Directeur adjoint, ACDA | ||
| Michael Novak | Membre du Conseil, démocrate | Représentant américain à la commission des Droits de l'homme de l'ONU (1981-1982) | ||
| Amoretta Hoeber | Membre du Conseil, républicain | Adjointe au Secrétaire adjoint de l'Armée de Terre pour la recherche et le développement ; adjointe au sous-Secrétaire à l'Armée de Terre | ||
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| Page 205 | Note 28 (p. 312) | Reagan et les néoconservateurs ont-ils gagné la guerre froide ? | ||
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| Lien vers le textechapitre_7_-_reagan_a-t-il_gagne_la_guerre_froide.doc | ||||
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| Page 205 | Note 32 (p. 312) | Citation de Christopher Layne sur la doctrine Reagan | ||
| “The Reagan Doctrine has never been authoritatively defined, but its content can be inferred from various statements made by President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz and the writings of such neoconservative foreign-policy theorists as Charles Krauthammer, Irving Kristol and Norman Podhoretz. Although usually thought of as a policy of aiding anti-communist insurgencies and building Western-style democracies in the Third World, the doctrine is much more than that. It aims to cause the Soviet empire's breakup and, ultimately, the collapse of the Soviet state itself by resisting Soviet and Soviet-supported aggression everywhere ; engaging the Kremlin in a high-tech arms race ; and pressuring Moscow economically.” | ||||
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| Page 205 | Note 35 (p. 312) | Citation de la directive NSDD-32 sur le refoulement de l'URSS | ||
| ”- To contain and reverse the expansion of Soviet control and military presence throughout the world, and to increase the costs of Soviet support and use of proxy, terrorist and subversive forces. - To foster, if possible in concert with our allies, restraint in Soviet military spending, discourage Soviet adventurism, and weaken the Soviet alliance system by forcing the USSR to bear the brunt of its economic shortcomings, and to encourage long-term liberalizing and nationalist tendencies within the Soviet Union and allied countries.” “Despite increasing pressures on its economy and the growing vulnerabilities of its empire, the Soviet military will continue to expand and modernize. […] the decade of the eighties will likely pose the greatest challenge to our survival and well-being since World War II […]”. | ||||
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| Page 207 | Note 38 (p. 312) | Citation de Ronald Reagan à la Chambre des Communes sur la promotion de la démocratie | ||
| “While we must be cautious about forcing the pace of change, we must not hesitate to declare our ultimate objectives and to take concrete actions to move toward them. We must be staunch in our conviction that freedom is not the sole prerogative of a lucky few but the inalienable and universal right of all human beings. […]
The objective I propose is quite simple to state: to foster the infrastructure of democracy, the system of a free press, unions, political parties, universities, which allows a people to choose their own way to develop their own culture, to reconcile their own differences through peaceful means. […] What I am describing now is a plan and a hope for the long term – the march of freedom and democracy which will leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash heap of history as it has left other tyrannies which stifle the freedom and muzzle the self-expression of the people. […] Let us now begin a major effort to secure the best – a crusade for freedom that will engage the faith and fortitude of the next generation.” | ||||
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| Page 209 | Note 44 (p. 313) | Citation de Strobe Talbott sur Paul Nitze et la révolution reaganienne | ||
| “He was too closely associated with the old regime – the post-World War II political, diplomatic and military order – to be entirely comfortable in the new regime that proclaimed the Reagan Revolution.” | ||||
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| Page 209 | Note 45 (p. 313) | Citation de Richard Perle sur le critère de succès d'une négociation sur la maîtrise des armements | ||
| “Congratulations ! You obviously did a good job because nothing happened.” | ||||
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| Pages 210-211 | Notes 51 et 54 (p. 313) | Citations sur l'inquiétude de Norman Podhoretz à l'égard de Ronald Reagan | ||
| 1982 “Nevertheless, what President Reagan's response to the Polish crisis reveals is that he has in practice been following a strategy of helping the Soviet Union stabilize its empire, rather than a strategy aimed at encouraging the breakup of that empire from within.” 1984 “Forfeiting the Churchillian role now might help Mr. Reagan win a second term, which he is likely to win anyway. But the cost of this added electoral insurance would be to retard the awakening of the West to the realities of the Soviet threat, thereby robbing his Presidency of its main historical mission.” | ||||
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| Page 212 | Note 55 (p. 313) | Citation de Ronald Reagan sur les jusqu'au-boutistes de la guerre froide | ||
| “Now, I think that some of the people who are objecting the most and just refusing even to accede to the idea of ever getting any understanding, whether they realize it or not, those people, basically, down in their deepest thoughts, have accepted that war is inevitable and that there must come to be a war between the two superpowers. Those people basically down in their deepest thoughts have accepted that war is inevitable and that there must come to be a war between the two superpowers.” | ||||
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| Page 212 | Note 56 (p. 313) | Topographie de l’establishment néoconservateur dans les années 1980 | ||
| Lien vers le textechapitre_7_-_topographie_de_l_establishment_neoconservateur.doc | ||||
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| Page 213 | Note 66 (p. 313) | La campagne du CPD pour une opinion publique tentée par le pacifisme, 1983-1988 | ||
| Lien vers le texte chapitre_7_-_la_campagne_du_cpd_pour_une_op_tentee_par_pacifisme.doc | ||||
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| Page 214 | Note 73 (p. 314) | Citation de Richard Perle sur le brouillon d'évaluation de la situation stratégique par le CPD | ||
| “It does seem to me that the draft gives the administration too little credit for some of the strategic force improvements we have inaugurated, even granting the fact that some of those forces will not enter the inventory for another few years. Similarly, while I would not paint a comforting picture of the strategic balance, I believe that the discussion on pages 71 and 72 – by focusing on some assumptions in the JCS analysis but overlooking other potential occurrence – somewhat overstates the situation we face today.” | ||||
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| Page 215 | Note 76 (p. 314) | Citation de Martin Amis sur sa visite dans les locaux du CPD | ||
| His name is David Trachtenberg. On his desk are scale models of intercontinental ballistic missiles (look at the size of those Soviet SS-18s !). On the wall behind his chair is a customised poster, jokingly accusing David of being a wanted man, 'convicted of supporting the SDI program'. Next to the poster is a cartoonish watercolour of an unreservedly grinning David, straddling the globe while missile squirt this way and that; to his right is Uncle Sam, to his left the Russian Bear. David's pals or loved ones evidently felt relaxed enough to present David with this picture, and David evidently felt relaxed enough to hang it on his office wall. David works for the Committee on the Present Danger ('Present Danger ?' sings the lady on the phone), the Recruiter think-tank that has supervised Reagan's nuclear policies. […] Otherwise, talking to David is like talking to your accountant. But I will certainly never forget the expression on David's face, one of saintly forbearance, as he told me the US had decreased its overall megatonnage in recent years.” | ||||
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| Page 216 | Note 79 (p. 314) | Citation de Eugene Rostow sur la nouvelle situation post-guerre froide | ||
| “For the moment, the Soviet Union is losing an important round of the Cold War in Eastern Europe”. “A helot Western Europe would be the inevitable agent of Soviet economic recovery. Gorbatchev's hopeful spring would fade into autumn and winter. And a new Gorbatchev would emerge as master of the Eurasian land mass from Brest and Cornwall to Vladivostock, a Gorbatchev who had finally succeeded where Napoleon, the Kaiser, Hitler, and Stalin had failed.” | ||||
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| Page 216 | Note 82 (p. 314) | Citation d'Elmo Zumwalt: démission du CPD | ||
| “Dear Charles : I am of the view of [sic] the Committee on the present danger has lost his momentum and is floundering. Please consider this letter as my resignation.” | ||||
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| Page 217 | Note 84 (p. 314) | Citation du CPD sur le danger par l'URSS en novembre 1991 | ||
| “… there is little sign that the US-Soviet strategic balance will shift toward a favorable US posture before the end of the century.” | ||||
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| Page 217 | Note 85 (p. 314) | Quelle a été l’influence politique du Committee on the Present Danger sur la politique étrangère américaine ? | ||
| Lien vers le texte chapitre_7_-_quelle_influence_du_cpd_sur_la_polea.doc | ||||
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| Page 217 | Note 87 (p. 314) | Citation de Frank Gaffney sur la persistance de la menace soviétique | ||
| “… the worst strategic miscalculation on the part of a president of the United States since the Yalta Conference of 1945.” “Never since 1945 has the Soviet Union been so close to military preeminence in Europe as it is today.” | ||||
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| Page 220 | Note 99 (p. 315) | Citation d'Irving Kristol sur les fondations conservatrices | ||
| “In one of my essays in the Wall Street Journal, I had urged such foundations to stop moaning about the welfare state, the “road to serfdom”, the death of free enterprise by “statism”, and the iniquities of the income tax, and address the realities of the conservative situation. I wrote this not as a “movement conservative” but as someone who thought it would be best for the American democracy if conservatives would engage in a serious way the world as it existed – a world that in some respects was prospering, despite those fatal injuries the New Deal had presumably inflicted on it.” | ||||
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| Page 222 | Note 106 (p. 315) | Topographie de l’establishment néoconservateur dans les années 1980 | ||
| Cf. plus haut (note 56 de la page 212) | ||||
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| Page 222 | Note 107 (p. 315) | Citation de Seymour Martin Lipset sur l'absence de néoconservateurs du premier âge dans l'administration Reagan | ||
| “No neoconservative was assigned to a post affecting economic or welfare policy, such as the Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, Labor, or Health and Human Services departments. The reason is fairly clear : questions of affirmative action and meritocracy apart, almost all the neoconservatives remained liberals on most domestic policy issues, at least as of the beginning of the Reagan administration.” | ||||
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| Page 222 | Note 108 (p. 315) | Citation de Jeane Kirkpatrick sur l'évolution de sa vision du monde dans les années 1980 | ||
| “The single most important change in my views in the last decade has been a much greater appreciation of market economics.” | ||||
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| Page 223 | Note 110 (p. 315) | Citation de Stephen Tonsor sur les néoconservateurs | ||
| “It was splendid when the town whore gets religion and joins the church. Now and then she makes a good choir director, but when she begins to tell the minister what he ought to say in his Sunday sermons, matters have been carried too far. … [Had] Stalin spared Leon Trotsky and not had him murdered in Mexico, he would no doubt have spent his declining days in an office in Hoover Library writing his memoirs and contributing articles of a faintly neoconservative flavor to Encounter and Commentary.” | ||||
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| Page 223 | Note 112 (p. 315) | Citation de Pat Buchanan sur les néoconservateurs | ||
| “We are not the world's policeman, nor its political tutor. Whence comes this arrogant claim to determine how other nations should govern themselves, or face subversion by NED, the Comintern of the neo-cons ?” | ||||
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| Page 223 | Note 113 (p. 315) | Citation de Russell Kirk sur la “double loyauté” des néoconservateurs | ||
| “… as if some eminent Neoconservatives mistook Tel Aviv for the capital of the United States - a position they will have difficulty maintaining, as matters drift in the Levant.” | ||||
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| Page 224 | Note 115 (p. 315) | Citation de Ben Wattenberg sur l'importance d'influencer le parti démocrate | ||
| “The Democratic Party is still the majority party in the most powerful nation in the world. It's a very important thing to influence. The prize is enormous – you are talking about what is going to be the intellectual tenor and content of a party that either in the near-term future or the intermediate-term future is going to be in office leading the free world.” | ||||
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| Page 224 | Note 116 (p. 315) | Citation de Penn Kemble sur l'objectif de la CDM | ||
| “return our party to the mainstream” | ||||
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| Page 225 | Note 118 (p. 315) | Citation d'Elliott Abrams et Midge Decter | ||
| “I was one of those who'd rather switch than fight […] The balance had shifted after 1972 and had not come back”. “We tried to wrest the Democratic Party back from the left, and we failed.” | ||||
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| Page 225 | Note 119 (p. 315) | 15 novembre 1983, la conférence de la CDM en l’honneur de Scoop Jackson | ||
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| Page 226 | Note 121 (p. 315) | Citation de James Woolsey sur le destin des démocrates conservateurs | ||
| “Those people who have a more organic view of society and a more relaxed attitude about leadership by the federal government on domestic matters and still want a strong defense and foreign policy don't have a natural home in the current American system. They have something of a natural home in the conservative side of the democratic party, up until relatively recently. But for the bulk of the Congress today, if you're on the democratic side, you're expected for example to be against ballistic missile defense, and also in favor of a progressive tax system. On the Republican side, you're expected to be in favor of ballistic missile defense but pretty much in favor of ballistic missile defense, but pretty much against a progressive tax system. For people who believe in a progressive tax system and in ballistic missile defense, you go around looking for a home.” | ||||
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| Page 226 | Note 122 (p. 315) | Citation de Penn Kemble sur la grève des aiguilleurs du ciel | ||
| “To say that you would oppose an administration that was fighting the fight against a totalitarian power that was threatening the very fundamentals of your democratic way of life for the sake of the air controllers getting a slightly better contract - you have to put things in perspective.” | ||||
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| Page 226 | Note 123 (p. 315) | Citation d'Elliott Abrams sur Scoop Jackson et Pat Moynihan | ||
| “Senator Jackson is no longer with us and Senator Moynihan is no longer with us.” | ||||
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| Page 227 | Note 126 (p. 316) | Citation de Pat Moynihan sur l'URSS en 1985 | ||
| “The Soviet idea is spent. It commands some influence in the world; and fear. But it summons no loyalty. History is moving away from it at astounding speed. We must be less obsessed with the Soviets. If we must learn to live with nuclear parity, let us keep all the more in mind that we have consolidated an overwhelming economic advantage.” | ||||
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| Page 227 | Note 128 (p. 316) | Citation du texte de la CDM “Democratic Solidarity” | ||
| “We contend that the fundamental issue of the contemporary world is the political struggle between the democratic way of life and those who would deny human liberty and political freedom.” | ||||
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| Page 227 | Note 129 (p. 316) | La Task Force Kampelman – Woolsey de 1984 : définir une politique étrangère néoconservatrice à l’ère Reagan | ||
| Lien vers le textechapitre_7_-_task_force_cdm_kampelman-woolsey.doc | ||||
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| Page 228 | Note 130 (p. 316) | Citation de Jeane Kirkpatrick sur les “démocrates de San Francisco” | ||
| “When our Marines, sent to Lebanon on a multinational peacekeeping mission with the consent of the United States Congress, were murdered in their sleep, the 'blame America first crowd' didn't blame the terrorists who murdered the Marines, they blamed the United States. But then, they always blame America first. When the Soviet Union walked out of arms control negotiations, and refused even to discuss the issues, the San Francisco Democrats didn't blame Soviet intransigence. They blamed the United States. But then, they always blame America first. When Marxist dictators shoot their way to power in Central America, the San Francisco Democrats don't blame the guerrillas and their Soviet allies, they blame United States policies of 100 years ago. But then, they always blame America first. The American people know better. […] And now, the American people, proud of our country, proud of our freedom, proud of ourselves, will reject the San Francisco Democrats and send Ronald Reagan back to the White House” | ||||
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| Page 229 | Note 133 (p. 316) | La “Task Force” Woolsey – McCurdy de politique étrangère de la CDM, 1986-89, et l’organisation PRODEMCA | ||
| Lien vers le textechapitre_7_-_task_force_woolsey_-_curdy_et_prodemca.doc | ||||
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| Page 229 | Note 136 (p. 316) | Le Democratic leadership council et l’invention des “nouveaux démocrates”, 1985-1992 | ||
| Lien vers le texte chapitre_7_-_le_dlc_et_les_nouveaux_democrates.doc | ||||
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| Page 232 | Notes 143 et 146 (p. 316) | Citations de Peter Rosenblatt sur la fusion CPD – DLC | ||
| “The think-tank should deal with policy across the board, but no single area could be of greater importance than foreign / defense policy. I hope and believe that we at CDM could essentially merge many of our functions with those of the new organization, drawing on the reputation we have achieved within the party.” “Al Frum never articulated any opposition to it, he just didn't move on it.” | ||||
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| Page 232 | Note 144 (p. 316) | Un mariage si souhaitable : arrangements possibles entre la Coalition for a Democratic Majority et le Democratic Leadership Council, 1989 | ||
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| Page 233 | Note 149 (p. 317) | Citation de Peter Rosenblatt sur l'élection de Bill Clinton comme objectif de la CDM | ||
| “CDM has been inactive for some years and we have recently decided to dissolve the organization upon the ground that its major objectives have been achieved with the election of president Clinton.” | ||||
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| Page 234 | Note 156 (p. 317) | Citation de Penn Kemble sur l'influence des néoconservateurs sur l'administration Clinton | ||
| “I thought we had influence in the Clinton administration. It was not like the Carter situation. Our views didn't prevail, certainly not on Bosnia and in the whole Balkan situation, it took far too long. But in the end, they came around to our position. […] When Madeleine Albright became Secretary of State, she had undergone a transformation, she almost talked as a person from CDM 'I'm a child of Munich, not of Vietnam' (which was not really the case). But also you know the Republicans were very irresponsible in the Clinton years – didn't support Bosnia, just looked for every opportunity to embarrass Clinton…” | ||||
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→ Revenir vers le Chapitre 6 - Alerter l'Amérique: le rôle du Committee on the Present Danger
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chapitre7.txt · Dernière modification: 2009/06/09 00:03 par justin
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