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chapitre8
Justin Vaïsse, Histoire du néoconservatisme aux Etats-Unis - Site Web compagnon

Chapitre 8 : “Le troisième âge du néoconservatisme”
(pages 235 à 279)


→ Continuer vers l'épilogue - Interpréter le néoconservatisme
→ Revenir vers le Chapitre 7 - Ronald Reagan: les néoconservateurs au pouvoir?
→ Retourner à la page d'accueil

Page 235 Note 1 (p. 317) Citations des “parrains” du néoconservatisme sur la mort du mouvement dans les années 1990
Norman Podhoretz: “no longer exists as a distinctive phenomenon requiring a special name of its own”
Irving Kristol: ”[neoconservatism] was a generational phenomenon, and has now been pretty much absorbed into a larger, more comprehensive conservatism.”
Seymour Martin Lipset: “The term lost its meaning as commentators applied it beyond its original application to strongly anti-communist leftists.”

Page 237 Note 4 (p. 317) Citations d'Irving Kristol sur le nouveau contexte de politique étrangère
“What am I supposed to feel and think? If the Soviets (or the Chinese or even the Cubans) were involved, I would know what to think, since we would then be confronting a challenge. But this is a purely internal Liberian matter, and while I am saddened by the sufferings of the Liberian people caught up in this conflict, I see no reason why Liberia today should even be within the purview of American foreign policy – or why the Times should be devoting so much space to it. There are many other examples that can be given, but they all add up to one conclusion: With the end of the Cold War, an era of American foreign policy has come to a close. We won that war. 'Global containment' of communism did work – far better, indeed, than we anticipated.”
“The only innovative trend in our foreign-policy thinking at the moment derives from a relatively small group, consisting of both liberals and conservatives, who believe there is an 'American mission' actively to promote democracy all over the world. This is a superficially attractive idea, but it takes only a few moments of thought to realize how empty of substance (and how full of presumption!) it is. In the entire history of the U.S., we have successfully 'exported' our democratic institutions to only two nations – Japan and Germany, after war and an occupation. We have failed to establish a viable democracy in the Philippines, or in Panama, or anywhere in Central America.”

Page 237 Note 7 (p. 317) Citations de Jeane Kirkpatrick sur la promotion de la démocratie
“…the belief that it is possible to democratize governments, anytime, anywhere, under any circumstances. […] Many of the wisest political scientists of this and previous centuries agree that democratic institutions are especially difficult to establish and maintain – because the make heavy demands on all portions of a population and because they depend on complex social, cultural and economic conditions.”
“Enormously desirable”

Page 240 Notes 16 et 17 (p. 317-318) Citations de la Defense Planning Guidance (1992) et de la Regional Strategy (1993)
“Together with our allies, we must preclude hostile nondemocratic powers from dominating regions critical to our interests and otherwise work to build an international environment conducive to our values.”
“a peaceful democratic order in which nations are able to pursue their legitimate interests without fear of military domination.”
“We also must encourage and assist Russia, Ukraine, and the other new states of the former Soviet Union in establishing democratic political systems and free markets so they too can join the democratic “zone of peace.” “||| |”History suggests that effective multilateral action is most likely to come about in response to U.S. leadership, not as an alternative to it.”

Page 243 Note 24 (p. 318) Citation de Robert Kagan sur les “10 Serbie”
“A timid superpower poses a greater danger to the present world order than ten Serbias.”

Pages 243 et 244 Notes 26 à 29 (p. 318) Citations de David Brooks et Bill Kristol sur le “conservatisme de la grandeur nationale” et John McCain
“How can Americans love their nation if they hate its government?”
“A conservatism that organizes citizens' resentments rather than informing their hopes will always fall short of fundamental victory”
“McCain doesn't say that government is oppressive and just needs to get out of the way. He says he wants to reform government to make us proud. He's proposed campaign finance reform, education reform, Social Security reform, a campaign against lobbyist-driven pork-barrel spending. Far from calling government an evil that needs to be dismantled, he says that public service is the noblest calling. As important but less obvious, at least until last week, McCain would redirect a religiously based moral conservatism into a patriotically grounded moral appeal. When McCain talks about remoralizing America, he talks in terms of reinvigorating patriotism. As his February 28 Virginia Beach speech shows nicely, when John McCain starts talking about religious faith, he ends up talking about patriotism.”

Page 247 Notes 36 et 37 (p. 318) Citations de Robert Kagan et Bill Kristol sur la puissance américaine
“Today, the absence of a Soviet empire does not alter the fundamental purposes of American foreign policy. Just as sensible Americans after World War II did not imagine that the United States should await the rise of the next equivalent of Nazi Germany, so American statesmen today ought to recognize that their charge is not to await the arrival of the next great threat. Rather, it is to shape the international environment to prevent such a threat from arising in the first place. To put it another way: The overarching goal of American foreign policy–to preserve and extend an international order that is in accord with both our material interests and our principles–endures. Americans must shape this order, for if we refrain from doing so, we can be sure that others will shape it in ways that reflect neither our interests nor our values.”
“The appropriate goal of American foreign policy, therefore, is to preserve that hegemony as far into the future as possible. To achieve this goal, the United States needs a neo-Reaganite foreign policy of military supremacy and moral confidence.”

Page 247 Note 38 (p. 318) Citation de Charles Krauthammer sur les démocraties intrinsèquement plus pacifiques
“Democracies are inherently more friendly to the United States, less belligerent to their neighbors, and generally more inclined to peace. Realists are right that to protect your interests you often have to go around the world bashing bad guys over the head. But that technique, no matter how satisfying, has its limits. At some point, you have to implant something, something organic and self-developing. And that something is democracy.”

Page 248 Note 41 (p. 318) Citation de Robert Kagan sur l'empire bienveillant
“America may be arrogant; Americans may at times be selfish; they may occasionally be ham-handed in their exercise of power. But, excusez-moi, compared with whom? Can anyone believe that were France to possess the power the United States now has, the French would be less arrogant, less selfish, and less prone to making mistakes?” “… and China's military buildup has not exactly been viewed by its neighbors as creating a more harmonious environment.”

Page 250 Note 47 (p. 318) Citation de Gary Dorrien sur l'importance du sionisme pour comprendre les néoconservateurs
“Hardline Zionism was a major component of their ideology but not the key to everything else.”

Page 252 Note 51 (p. 319) Citation de Charles Krauthammer sur la définition de l'intérêt national
“First, containing, deterring, and, if necessary, disarming rogue states that are acquiring weapons of mass destruction, states that could threaten with unprecedented power not only our allies and our troops abroad, but eventually America itself.
Second, containing a rising China, a country whose position on the globe at the turn of the 2 Ist century is comparable to that of Germany at the turn of the 20th-a large, growing, former have-not, seeking its place in the sun, pushing inexorably against its neighbors.
Third, maintaining vigilance against the possibility of a resurgent, revanchist Russia.
Fourth, maintaining order as the ultimate guarantor of international peace and stability. As the only nation that can project power anywhere in the world decisively and overwhelmingly, our role is to husband our resources to meet supraregional challenges-i.e., those that threaten not just a country or a region but the stability of the international system itself.”

Page 255 Note 57 (p. 319) Citation de Lawrence Kaplan sur George W. Bush
“George W. Bush flatly admits he won't intervene to stop 'genocide in nations outside our strategic interest.' For all his invocation of Reagan, his 'distinctly American internationalism' amounts to nothing more than a variation of old-world realpolitik and an echo of Gerald Ford.”

Page 255 Note 58 (p. 319) Citation du texte de l'Ethics and Public Policy Center, “Idealism without Illusions”
“American leadership must never remain indifferent to tyranny, must never be agnostic about the virtues of political and economic freedom, must always be concerned with the fortunes of fragile democracies”

Page 257 Note 64 (p. 319) Citation de Gary Schmitt sur George W. Bush, chef des services d'urgence plutôt que commandant en chef juste après le 11-Septembre
“The country's been attacked and the president seemed more concerned with being the FEMA chief than the commander in chief,” Schmitt said, referring to the disaster-relief agency. “They can't be telling people things should be normal but there's a war going on.”

Pages 257 à 259 Notes 65-73 (p. 319) Citations de plusieurs discours de George W. Bush
“The Empire has passed, but evil remains… The most powerful force in the world is not a weapon or a nation but a truth: that we are spiritual beings, and that freedom is “the soul's right to breathe.”
“So it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.”
“Free societies do not intimidate through cruelty and conquest, and open societies do not threaten the world with mass murder”
“The world has a clear interest in the spread of democratic values, because stable and free nations do not breed the ideologies of murder”
“the advance of freedom within nations will build the peace among nations”
“A new regime in Iraq would serve as a dramatic and inspiring example of freedom for other nations in the region”
“Some who call themselves realists question whether the spread of democracy in the Middle East should be any concern of ours. But the realists in this case have lost contact with a fundamental reality: America has always been less secure when freedom is in retreat; America is always more secure when freedom is on the march.”

Page 259 Note 74 (p. 319) Citation de la “National Security Strategy” de 2002
“Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States.”

Page 263 Note 82 (p. 320) Citation de la lettre du PNAC sur la guerre contre le terrorisme
“Failure to undertake such an effort will constitute an early and perhaps decisive surrender in the war on international terrorism.”

Page 264 Note 87 (p. 320) Citation du “Downing Street memo”
“C. reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy.”

Page 266 Note 92 (p. 320) Citation de Joe Lieberman sur son positionnement politique
“I'm a Harry Truman, JFK, Scoop Jackson and Bill Clinton Democrat… I agree more often than not with Democrats on domestic policy. I agree more often than not with Republicans on foreign and defense policy.”

Page 268 Note 99 (p. 320) Citation d'Anatol Lieven sur les “faucons libéraux”
“…the Democratic Party should encourage these figures to take the same route to the Republican Party as their Scoop Jackson predecessors, but much more quickly, and give them a strong push along the way.”

Page 269 Note 102 (p. 320) Citation de Condoleezza Rice sur le traitement à réserver aux alliés après la guerre en Irak
“Punish France, ignore Germany, and forgive Russia”

Page 270 Note 106 (p. 321) Citation de Fouad Ajami sur les Etats-Unis en Irak
“We are strangers in Iraq, and we didn't know the place.”

Page 270 Note 109 (p. 321) Citation de Richard Perle sur le rôle des néoconservateurs dans la guerre en Irak
“Huge mistakes were made,” Richard Perle says, “and I want to be very clear on this: they were not made by neoconservatives, who had almost no voice in what happened, and certainly almost no voice in what happened after the downfall of the regime in Baghdad. I'm getting damn tired of being described as an architect of the war. I was in favor of bringing down Saddam. Nobody said, 'Go design the campaign to do that.' I had no responsibility for that.”

Page 275 Note 119 (p. 321) Citation de David Brooks sur les néoconservateurs aveuglés par l'idéalisme
“There was a failure to understand the effect our power would have on other people around the world. We were so sure we were using our might for noble purposes, we assumed that sooner or later, everybody else would see that as well.”

Page 275 Note 120 (p. 321) Citation de Richard Perle sur Albert Wohlstetter
“For Albert, it was just impermissible to assume anything. You had to run down every fact, every proposition. He was a mathematical logician by training.”

Page 276 Note 124 (p. 321) Citation de Richard Perle sur les experts du monde arabe
“This [persistent failure of the US approach toward the Middle East] stems from both the curious ideas about American leadership and the abysmal state of expertise that are held by many regional specialists, particularly in our intelligence community.”

Page 278 Notes 129 et 130 (p. 321) Citations de Paul Wolfowitz sur la démocratie
“You hear people mock it by saying that Iraq isn't ready for Jeffersonian democracy, Wolfowitz says, citing a line that Colin Powell has been known to use. Well, Japan isn't Jeffersonian democracy, either. I think the more we are committed to influencing the outcome, the more chance there could be that it would be something quite significant for Iraq. And I think if it's significant for Iraq, it's going to cast a very large shadow, starting with Syria and Iran, but across the whole Arab world, I think.”
“Export of democracy isn’t really a good phrase. We’re trying to remove the shackles on democracy.”

→ Continuer vers l'épilogue - Interpréter le néoconservatisme
→ Revenir vers le Chapitre 7 - Ronald Reagan: les néoconservateurs au pouvoir?
→ Retourner à la page d'accueil

chapitre8.txt · Dernière modification: 2008/10/24 05:43 par justin